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THE UNSUPERVISED CHILD: PARENTAL
NEGLIGENCE OR NECESSITY?
INTRODUCTION
The parent-child tort immunity rule denies a minor child a
cause of action against his parents for intentional or negligent torts.1
This rule, created by the American courts, was founded on several
policy considerations.2 However, recent judicial attacks on these
underlying policy considerations have resulted in a trend toward
abrogation of the rule.' Although several states have been reluctant
to abolish parental immunity in negligence actions,' a growing
number of states have recognized a child's cause of action against
the parent for negligence.'
1. See PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 865 (4th ed. 1971). Examples of court holdings
which prohibited a child's action against the parent for intentional torts are: Miller v.
Pelzer, 159 Minn. 375, 199 N.W. 97 (1924) (deceit); Cook v. Cook, 232 Mo. App. 994, 124
S.W.2d 675 (1939) (assault); McKelvey v. McKelvey, 111 Tenn. 388, 77 S.W. 664 (1903)
(cruel and inhuman treatment); Roller v. Roller, 37 Wash. 242, 79 P. 788 (1905) (rape).
Examples of holdings which prohibited a child's negligence actions are: Villaret v.
Villaret, 169 F.2d 677 (D.C. Cir. 1948); Hastings v. Hastings, 33 N.J. 247, 163 A.2d 147
(1961); Chaffin v. Chaffin, 239 Or. 374, 397 P.2d 771 (1964); Ownby v. Kleyhammer, 194
Tenn. 109, 250 S.W.2d 37 (1952); Stevens v. Murphy, 69 Wash. 2d 939, 421 P.2d 668
(1966).
2. See notes 24-29 infra and accompanying text.
3. See notes 48-78 infra and accompanying text.
4. Jurisdictions which have abrogated parent-child tort immunity for inten-
tional torts are: Horton v. Reeves, 186 Colo. 149, 526 P.2d 304 (1974); Sanford v. San-
ford, 15 Md. App. 390, 290 A.2d 812 (1972); Felderhoff v. Felderhoff, 473 S.W.2d 928
(Tex. 1971).
It would appear that the Arkansas courts might also recognize a child's ac-
tions against his parent for an intentional tort. One court stated: "We therefore hold
that an unemancipated minor may not maintain an action for an involuntary tort
against his parent .. " Rambo v. Rambo, 195 Ark. 832, 837, 114 S.W.2d 468, 470 (1938)
(emphasis added). See also Brown v. Cole, 198 Ark. 417, 129 S.W.2d 245 (1939), where
the court permitted a deceased child's estate to sue an adoptive parent for pain and
suffering resulting from an intentional poisoning. However, it is difficult to determine
whether the court permitted the action since the parent was only an adoptive parent
or because the tort was intentional.
5. Jurisdictions which have abrogated parent-child tort immunity in all areas
of negligence are: Xaphes v. Mossey, 224 F. Supp. 578 (D. Vt. 1963); Gibson v. Gibson,
3 Cal. 3d 914, 479 P.2d 648, 92 Cal. Rptr. 288 (1971); Petersen v. City & County of
Honolulu, 51 Hawaii 484, 462 P.2d 1007 (1969); Plumley v. Klein, 388 Mich. 1, 199
N.W.2d 631 (1968); Rupert v. Stienne, 90 Nev. 397, 528 P.2d 1013 (1974); Briere v.
Briere, 107 N.H. 432, 224 A.2d 588 (1966); Gelbman v. Gelbman, 23 N.Y.2d 434, 245
N.E.2d 912, 297 N.Y.S.2d 529 (1969); Nuelle v. Wells, 154 N.W.2d 364 (N.D. 1967);
Goller v. White, 20 Wis. 2d 402, 122 N.W.2d 193 (1963). For jurisdictions which have
abrogated parent-child tort immunity in car accidents only, see Hebel v. Hebel, 435
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Those states which recognize a child's right to sue his parents
for negligence face the serious problem of interfering with certain
duties inherent in the family relationship.' Among these is the
parental duty to rear a child.! Recognizing the potential for judicial
interference with a parent's duty to rear a child, some jurisdictions
have granted parental immunity where an act of parental discretion
results in injury to the child." However, when a child suffers injury
resulting from a parent's failure to adequately protect the child, the
courts should determine whether this failure constitutes an abuse of
parental discretion resulting in an actionable tort for the injured
child.
While a few jurisdictions apparently would recognize an
actionable tort for negligent parental supervision,9 several courts
have denied the action reasoning that the parental duty to supervise
is inseparable from the parental duty to rear a child. '0 Consequently,
P.2d 8 (Alaska 1967); Streenz v. Streenz, 106 Ariz. 86, 471 P.2d 282 (1970); Ooms v.
Ooms, 164 Conn. 48, 316 A.2d 783 (1972) (abrogated by statute); Williams v. Williams,
369 A.2d 669 (Del. Super. Ct. 1976); Sorensen v. Sorensen, 369 Mass. 350, 339 N.E.2d
907 (1975); France v. A.P.A. Transp. Corp., 56 N.J. 500, 267 A.2d 490 (1970); Smith v.
Kauffman, 212 Va. 181, 183 S.E.2d 190 (1971).
6. In Paige v. Bing Const. Co., 61 Mich. App. 480, 233 N.W.2d 46 (1975), the
court stated:
Each parent has unique and inimitable methods and attitudes on how
children should be supervised. Likewise, each child requires individualized
guidance depending on the intuitive concerns which only a parent can
understand. Also different cultural, educational and financial conditions
affect the manner in which different parents supervise their children.
Allowing a cause of action for negligent supervision would enable others,
ignorant of a case's peculiar familiar distinctions and bereft of any stan-
dards to second guess a parent's management of family affairs con-
siderably beyond these statutory protections.
Id. at 482, 233 N.W.2d at 49.
7. McCurdy, Torts Between Persons in a Domestic Relation, 43 HARV. L.
REV. 1030 (1930). McCurdy stated:
Although since he is charged with the duty of rearing and disciplining his
child, a parent has the right to inflict bodily injury, and is therefore
privileged, and although in the performance of this duty and also of his
duty to support he is necessarily given wide latitude of judgment, he does
not enjoy complete immunity from accountability. Excessive, willful or
negligent conduct may forfeit the right of custody or may constitute a
crime.
Id at 1059.
8. See notes 30-46 infra and accompanying text.
9. See note 5 supr.
10. E.g., in Holodook v. Spencer, 36 N.Y.2d 35, 324 N.E.2d 338, 364 N.Y.S.2d
859 (1974), the court stated: "a parent's duty to protect his child from injury (is] a duty
which not only rises from the family relation but goes to its very heart." Id. at 51, 324
N.E.2d at 346, 364 N.Y.S.2d at 871.
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a child, who because of his age and inexperience cannot appreciate
surrounding dangers," must suffer his injuries uncompensated. Ad-
ditionally, if a third party negligently causes injury to the child,
liability rests solely upon the third party, as third-party recovery
of a judgment against the parent for contribution is barred." These
results arguably are inequitable in light of the fact that the parent
is in the better position to recognize foreseeable dangers and exer-
cise control over the child.'
Considering these inequities, this note discusses the policies
underlying parent-child tort immunity and examines the various
judicial approaches used to determine whether a parental duty to
supervise exists. Finally, the "reasonable parent"'15 is proferred as
an equitable standard to determine the parental duty to supervise a
child.
THE PARENT-CHILD IMMUNITY RULE:
ORIGIN, JUDICIALLY CREATED EXCEPTIONS AND SUBSEQUENT
ABROGATION
The parent-child tort immunity rule had its origin in early
American court decisions."8 These courts reasoned that parental im-
munity was a necessary means for preserving family integrity and
enabling a parent to properly rear his child.' Recent court decisions,
however, have abandoned this reasoning and have permitted a
child's cause of action in exceptional situations. 8 This trend away
from strict adherence to the parent-child tort immunity rule has in-
fluenced courts of several jurisdictions to modify 9 and even
abrogate"' the rule.
11. Paige v. Bing Const. Co., 61 Mich. App. at 482, 233 N.W.2d at 48.
12. See PROSSER. supra note 1, at 297.
13. The third party cannot recover a judgment for contribution against the
parent in absence of a duty owed by the parent to the child. See Barry v. Niagra Fron-
tier Transit Sys., Inc., 35 N.Y.2d 629, 324 N.E.2d 312, 364 N.Y.S.2d 823 (1975); Dole v.
Dow Chem. Co., 30 N.Y.2d 143, 282 N.E.2d 288, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382 (1972). Since the
parent owes the child no duty to supervise, a third party's claim for contribution
against the parents cannot stand. Holodook v. Spencer, 36 N.Y.2d 35, 324 N.E.2d 338,
364 N.Y.S.2d 859 (1974).
14. Responsibility for a child's safety lies primarily with the parents whose
duty it is to see that the child's behavior does not invoke damage to himself or others.
Kay v. Ludwick, 87 Ind. App. 114, 230 N.E.2d 494 (1967).
15. California is the only jurisdiction that has adopted a "reasonable parent"
standard. See, Gibson v. Gibson, 3 Cal. 3d 914, 479 P.2d 648, 92 Cal. Rptr. 288 (1971).
16. See notes 30-69 infra and accompanying text.
17. See notes 24-28 infra and accompanying text.
18. See text accompanying notes 80-105 infra.
19. See notes 4 and 5 supra.
20. See note 5 supra.
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Policy Considerations Underlying The Parent-Child Tort Immunity
Rule
At common law, a parent or his minor child could maintain an
action against the other in matters of property law.' Although there
are no common law cases involving personal torts between a parent
and a child, Dean Prosser suggests that "there is no good reason to
think the English laws would not permit actions for personal torts
as well, subject always to the parent's privilege to enforce reasonable
discipline against his child."' However, in a series of cases referred
to as the "great trilogy," 3 the American courts adopted the parent-
child tort immunity rule. This action by the courts was a response to
several public policy considerations which included the preservation
of family peace," the maintenance of a family fund rather than per-
mitting a single child to appropriate money needed to support the
other members of the family,25 the fear of fraudulent and frivolous
claims," and the avoidance of the absurdity which would result if
the child predeceased the parent thereby allowing the parent to
recover the child's tort damages through intestate succession. 7 Ad-
ditionally, the courts in reaching their decisions analogized parent-
child tort immunity to the common law immunity which existed be-
tween a husband and his wife.2" While adherents to the trilogy
deemed these policy considerations valid, several jurisdictions ap-
parently adopted Dean Prosser's rationale which would provide a
child with an actionable tort against his parents.'
The first case of the trilogy which denied a child an actionable
tort was Hewellette v. George."0 In Hewellette a mother had
21. See Preston v. Preston, 102 Conn. 96, 128 A. 292 (1925) (deed of trust set
aside on a finding of undue influence); Crowley v. Crowley, 72 N.H. 241, 56 A. 190
(1903) (trust in favor of the minor not the parent if paid for with the minor's money);
Lamb v. Lamb, 146 N.Y. 317, 41 N.E. 26 (1895) (mother could be held liable to a child
for rent).
22. PROSSER supra note 1, at 865.
23. The three cases constituting the "great trilogy" are Hewellette v. George,
68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885 (1891); McKelvey v. McKelvey, 111 Tenn. 388, 77 S.W. 664
(1903); Roller v. Roller, 37 Wash. 242, 79 P. 788 (1905). For a thorough discussion of the
parent-child tort immunity rule, see Akers & Drummond, Tort Actions Between
Members of the Family-Husband and Wife-Parent and Child, 26 Mo. L. REV. 152, 182
(1961).
24. See Hewellette v. George, 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885 (1891).
25. Roller v. Roller, 37 Wash. 242, 79 P. 788 (1905).
26. Hastings v. Hastings, 33 N.J. 247, 163 A.2d 147 (1961).
27. Roller v. Roller, 37 Wash. at 245, 79 P. at 789.
28. Id Accord, McKelvey v. McKelvey, 111 Tenn. 388, 77 S.W. 664 (1903).
29. See note 5 supr.
30. 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885 (1891). In this action for wrongful commitment to
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wrongfully committed her child to an insane asylum.31 Citing no
authority, the Mississippi Supreme Court denied the cause of action
reasoning that no civil action could be maintained as long as the
parent was under the obligation to care for, guide and control, and
the child was under the reciprocal obligation to aid, comfort and
obey. 2 Additionally, the court believed that it was in the best in-
terest of society to deny the cause of action in order to preserve
peace in the family and society as well.13 Thus, a child's only protec-
tion from parental violence and wrongdoing was found in the
criminal law.' Apparently the court in Hewellette saw no reason for
providing an additional civil remedy.
The decision reached in Hewellette was soon followed in other
jurisdictions. Relying heavily on the rationale advanced in
Hewellette, the Supreme Court of Tennessee denied a minor child's
action against her father and stepmother for cruel and inhuman
punishment.35 Since common law recognized a parent's right to con-
trol and chastise the child, the court held that these rights could
only be forfeited by gross misconduct on the parent's part.3 Accord-
ing to the court, even if the parent's actions constituted gross
misconduct, the child would have no civil remedy. 3' Rather, the
child's only redress was through the criminal law and in the remedy
furnished by a writ of habeas corpus. 3'
The court analogized this civil parent-child immunity to in-
traspousal immunity.39 The latter immunity rested upon the unity of
legal identity by virtue of marriage and upon the respective rights
and duties existing between a husband and his wife."' These rights
included the husband's right to control the wife and her subsequent
duty to obey. 1 Similarly, a child was also subject to the parent's con-
an insane asylum, the minor daughter was married but had been living away from her
husband. However, the court suggested that an action could be maintained if the
marital relationship had eliminated those duties inherent in a parent-child relationship.
These include the parent's duty to protect, care for and control the child, and the
child's duty to aid, comfort and obey the parent.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 705, 9 So. at 887.
33. 1&
34. Id.
35. McKelvey v. McKelvey, 111 Tenn. 388, 77 S.W. 664 (1903).
36. Id.
37. See note 7 supra.
38. McKelvey v. McKelvey, 111 Tenn. at 388, 77 S.W. at 664.
39. 1L at 389, 77 S.W. at 665.
40. Id
41. Id At common law, the husband had reasonable superiority and control
over the wife's person authorizing him to put gentle restraints on her liberty if her
conduct was such to require it. Obviously, such legal dominance no longer exists.
1980]
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trol and had the subsequent duty to obey.'" Although no unity of
legal identity existed between the parent and the child," the court
concluded that the respective rights and duties common to both
relationships justified extending immunity to the parent-child rela-
tionship."
This parent-child immunity was further extended in the final
case of the trilogy, Roller v. Roller.5 In Roller, a daughter sought
damages from her father for raping her." Due to the heinous nature
of the crime, the court recognized that the policy consideration
relating to the preservation of the family peace was inapplicable. 7
In spite of this, the court denied the daughter's cause of action ad-
vancing other policy considerations which supported parent-child
tort immunity.
One of the considerations advanced by the Roller court was the
parent's potential reacquisition of the child's tort damages through
intestate succession should the child predecease the parent." While
this consideration was equally applicable to a child's cause of action
in property matters, several courts considered it too remote to bar
42. Id.
43. See notes 63-67 infra and accompanying text.
44. 111 Tenn. at 389, 77 S.W. at 665. The court referred to the fact that a
wife could divorce her husband. But even after a divorce, a wife was not permitted to
maintain an action against her husband as he had a right to restrain her liberty. See
Abbot v. Abbot, 67 Me. 304 (1877). The court analogized the parent-child relationship
to that of a divorced husband and wife and concluded that each relation should be
treated the same.
45. 37 Wash. 242, 79 P. 788 (1905).
46. Id.
47. Id. Although there was no purpose for preserving the peace in this par-
ticular case, the court recognized preservation of the peace as a valid policy considera-
tion by declaring:
The rule of law prohibiting suits between a parent and a child is based
upon the interest that society has in preserving harmony in the domestic
relations, an interest which has been manifested since the earliest
organization of civilized government, an interest inspired by the universally
recognized fact that the maintenance of harmonious and proper family rela-
tions is conducive to good citizenship and therefore works to the welfare of
the state.
Id. at 243-44, 79 P. at 788.
48. Id. at 245, 79 P. at 789. This argument suggests that if a parent is com-
pelled to pay damages to a child, he might reacquire the damages paid in the event
that the child should predecease him since the parent would take by intestacy.
Therefore, the parent should not have to pay damages which he might recover later.
However, such a conclusion should not be based on a remote possibility. See McCurdy,
supra note 7. Accord, Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 150 A. 905 (1930).
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the child's action in property.49 Arguably, since this consideration
does not bar a child's property action against his parent, there is no
logical reason for utilizing the same consideration to bar a child's
tort action. 0 Such inconsistent treatment of a child's rights weakens
the rationale used by the Roller court to deny the child's cause of
action.
Another consideration utilized by the Roller court was that
each family should maintain sufficient funds to be used to provide
all members of the family with the necessities of life, rather than
permit one child to appropriate the funds for his own use. 1 According
to the Roller court, permitting the child to appropriate the family funds
would deprive other family members of their necessities for life,5"
resulting in unequal treatment of the family nfembers. This unequal
treatment could cause additional family strife. 3
Although the Roller court's concern for other members of the
family was admirable, it ignored other factors which warrant a
parent's payment of damages to a child where the parent's tortious
conduct causes a child's injuries. One such factor is the necessity to
preserve the property of a child. 4 While in most cases a child's
capital does not consist of property in the usual sense, a child does
have capital in the nature of physical and mental abilities which give
rise to potential earning power.5 5 Since an injury to a child could im-
pair these abilities and thereby reduce his potential earning power,
effectively the child's property has been damaged.5 ' Applying com-
mon law which recognized a child's action against the parent to
recover property,57 it would follow that common law would also
recognize a child's right to recover damages in tort as a means of
49. See note 21 supra.
50. Such a consideration is absurd. Assume a father violently tears a shirt
from his child. As a result the child suffers a severe sprain. If the child brings an
action for his damaged shirt, the court will sustain the action since it concerns proper-
ty. However, if the child brings a tort action for the physical injuries suffered, the
court will deny the action even though the physical injury and property damages arose
from the same transaction.
51. 37 Wash. at 245, 79 P. at 789.
52. Id.
53. There is always a possibility of jealousy and disharmony between the
enriched child and other members of the family.
54. See McCurdy, supra note 7, at 1073.
55. I&
56. Id-
57. See note 21 supra.
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returning the child to the status quo.' Awarding a child damages in
tort does not constitute unequal treatment of family members, but
rather it represents equitable treatment as it returns the child to
his status quo.
Additionally, no child has a legally recognizable claim to a
parent's property nor to equality of treatment.59 Since members of
the family cannot demand that the parent distribute his property in
a particular manner, a parent has the right to divert his property to
a particular child. ° Consequently, where a parent's tortious conduct
results in a child's injuries, the parent may recompense the child
without violating the rights of the other members of the family.
Because a parent's payment of damages to a child does not violate
the rights of other family members, but instead, results in equitable
treatment in that it compensates an injured child,"1 the maintenance
of a family fund is an inappropriate consideration in denying a
child's cause of action against his parent in tort.
Paralleling the rationale of the Supreme Court of Tennessee,"2
the Roller court drew an analogy to the common law immunity
which existed between a husband and his wife.' However, in-
traspousal immunity is not based solely on the existence of a family
relationship; rather, it has resulted from the common law concept of
unity of identity.u This concept merged the separate identities of a
man and a woman into a single legal identity by virtue of their mar-
58. McCurdy suggests that it is the policy of the law to protect the property
of the minor child, to the end that his property is unimpaired when he reaches majority.
While the child's property referred to here is not capital in the usual sense, but his
physical and mental well-being, it seems there is an equally strong policy to keep these
things unimpaired. A payment of damages is compensation for this impairment by way of
money substitution and therefore, it is not unequal treatment of a child. McCurdy, supra
note 7, at 1073. "The minor child has the same right to redress for wrongs as any
other individual." Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. at 353, 150 A. at 906.
59. In Rice v. Andrews, 127 Misc. 826, 217 N.Y.S. 528 (Sup. Ct. 1926), the
court stated:
One has a legal right ... to disinherit any natural heir or next of kin, and
if he chooses to cut off his child and will his property to others, such child
has no claim against his father's estate for his support and maintenance,
but must shift for himself or be dependent on others for his support.
Id. at 827-28, 217 N.Y.S. at 530.
60. hI
61. See McCurdy, supra note 7, at 1073.
62. McKelvey v. McKelvey, 111 Tenn. at 338, 77 S.W. at 664.
63. 37 Wash. at 245, 79 P. at 789.
64. See PROSSER, supra note 1, at 859.
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riage 5 Because a husband and his wife had the same legal identity,
common law required that the husband be joined as a party in any
suit defended or prosecuted by his wife." As a result of this joinder,
if one spouse brought an action against the other, he would effec-
tively be suing himself. Such an action lacked adversity and was
therefore impermissible. 7 But unlike the merger which occurred be-
tween a husband and a wife, the common law had no similar concept
which merged the separate identities of a parent and a child into
one legal identity." Inferably, a child's cause of action against a
parent would be permissible at common law since adversity in the
lawsuit would exist. 9 Hence, the Roller court's analogy to the com-
mon law immunity which existed between a husband and a wife fails
and should not serve to bar a child's cause of action against a
parent.
65. The merger occurred as a result of several common law considerations.
At common law a woman's capacity to hold title to property was not destroyed by
marriage; nevertheless, marriage had important consequences. The husband had the
right to use and enjoy whatever his wife owned at the time of marriage or that which
she acquired afterwards. Although the fee remained in the wife a husband could
possess the land and was entitled to its rents and profits. Additionally the husband
had the right to use the wife's choses in action and to this end to reduce them to
possession, whereby, they become chattels personal. Due to the perishable nature of
the chattels and the common law denial of estates therein, his right to use these in-
volved such complete dominion as to amount to ownership. Therefore he had legal title
by operation of law.
Furthermore, a married woman could not contract for herself but only as an
agent of others. She could not convey her fee to real property without joining her hus-
band as a party to the conveyance. Neither the husband nor the wife could contract for
or convey property to the other. The husband also was entitled to his wife's services
and earnings.
Since the husband exercised such control over his wife's property he became
liable for her actions. A married woman had the capacity to commit torts but her
liability was in a sense suspended during marriage, and the husband was subjected to
liability. However, the action had to be brought against both the husband and the wife.
A combination of all these incidents made it impossible at common law for one spouse
ever to be civilly liable to the other for an act which would constitute a tort but for
the marital relationship. See McCurdy, supra note 7, at 1031-35.
66. ld. Accord, PROSSER, supra note 1, at 859.
67. Bandfield v. Bandfield, 117 Mich. 80, 75 N.W. 287 (1898) (wife sued her
husband for infecting her with a venereal disease).
68. See McCurdy, supra note 7, at 1056.
69. See PROSSER, supra note 1, at 865. Accord, Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352,
150 A. 905 (1930), which states that "t]here has never been a common law rule that a
child could not sue his parent. It is a misapprehension of the situation to start with
that idea and to treat the suits which have been allowed as exceptions to a general
rule." Id at 353, 150 A. at 906.
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In addition to the considerations advanced by the Roller court,
recent decisions barring the child's action suggest that the child
may prosecute frivolous and fraudulent claims in order to milk funds
from an insurer."0 Such possibility stems from the collusive nature
inherent in the family relationship. Since a child has only limited
knowledge concerning legal duties and remedies, the decision to
litigate a tort action against the parent tortfeasor often will be
made within the family circle, particularly by the parents.71 As a
practical matter, the action will be prosecuted only if the parent
tortfeasor has adequate liability insurance." According to several
courts, this consensual litigation violates the basic legal concept of
adversity." Therefore, the courts have reasoned that fraud and col-
lusion are valid policy considerations for denying the child a tort
action against his parents."
Although these courts seem to advance logical reasons for bar-
ring a child's tort action against his parents, they have ignored the
practical bondaries inherent in the litigation process which serve
to curb such abuse. Rather than deny the child's cause of action
because of the possibility of fraud and collusion, the courts should
instruct the jury to exercise caution in assessing the facts of each
case.75 Arguably, fraud and collusion might be possibilities in any
action where liability insurance is present. Therefore, if fraud and
collusion are valid considerations in barring a child's tort action
against a parent, then they should be valid considerations in barring
all tort claims.77 Since no great influx of fraudulent cases has
resulted where courts have permitted tort action between others in
intimate relationships, it is illogical to assume such an influx will
occur if the courts permit a child to sue his parent." Thus, the mere
70. See Villaret v. Villaret, 169 F.2d 677 (D.C. Cir. 1948); Treschman v.
Treschman, 28 Ind. App. 206, 61 N.E. 961 (1901); Luster v. Luster, 299 Mass. 488, 13
N.E.2d 438 (1938); Hastings v. Hastings, 33 N.J. 247, 163 A.2d 147 (1960), overruled in
France v. A.P.A. Transp. Corp. 56 N.J. 500, 267 A.2d 490 (1970); Parks v. Parks, 390
Pa. 287, 135 A.2d 65 (1957).
71. Hastings v. Hastings, 33 N.J. at 252, 163 A.2d at 150.
72. Id.
73. Id
74. See note 70 supra.
75. Rozell v. Rozell, 281 N.Y. 106, 22 N.E.2d 254 (1939) (brother suing a
sister).
76. Klein v. Klein, 58 Cal. 2d 692, 376 P.2d 70, 26 Cal. Rptr. 102 (1962).
Accord, Emery v. Emery, 45 Cal. 2d 421, 289 P.2d 218 (1955).
77. Klein v. Klein, 58 Cal. 2d at 696, 376 P.2d at 73, 26 Cal. Rptr. at 105.
78. Rozell v. Rozell, 281 N.Y. at 113, 22 N.E.2d at 257. Accord, Leach v.
Leach, 227 Ark. 599, 300 S.W.2d 15 (1957) (husband suing wife); Burdick v. Nawrocki,
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possibility of fraud and collusion is a relatively insignificant con-
sideration in denying a child a cause of action against his parent in
tort.
The parent-child tort immunity rule, as promulgated by the
great trilogy presented an absolute bar to a child's action in tort
against a parent. Founded on several policy considerations, the rule
was susceptible to change when these policy considerations became
inapplicable."9 As a result, several jurisdictions carved out excep-
tions to the parent-child tort immunity rule where public policy no
longer mandated the imposition of immunity.
Exceptions To The Parent-Child Tort Immunity Rule Resulting In
Abrogation
A retreat from the parent-child tort immunity rule has lagged
behind the retreat from intraspousal immunity due to the failure of
state legislatures to enact statutes permitting a child's cause of
action against the parent." However, courts have modified the
parent-child tort immunity rule to include exceptional circumstances
where a child's cause of action will lie against the parent." These ex-
ceptions are evidence of the increasing disapproval of the ab-
21 Conn. Supp. 272, 154 A.2d 242 (1959) (stepson suing stepfather); Hamburger v. Katz,
10 La. App. 215, 120 So. 391 (1928) (father suing son-in-law); Spaulding v. Mineah, 239
A.D. 460, 268 N.Y.S. 772 (1948) (child suing grandmother); Courtney v. Courtney, 184
Okla. 395, 87 P.2d 660 (1938) (wife suing husband); Bielke v. Knaack, 207 Wis. 490, 242
N.W. 176 (1932) (brother suing brother); Potter v. Potter, 229 Wis. 251, 272 N.W. 34
(1937) (brother-in-law suing brother-in-law).
79. In abrogating parent-child tort immunity the court in Briere v. Briere, 107
N.H. 432, 224 A.2d 588 (1966), stated:
[T]he law of torts itself is not, as sometimes erroneously considered, 'a
law of wrongs.' Rather it is a means 'for the creation and protection of
rights'-a method for providing compensation for harm caused another.
(Citation omitted). In the field of torts also, conditions are not static but
dynamic, as the law grows and changes to meet new social and economic
conditions.
Id. at 434, 224 A.2d at 590.
80. See PROSSER, supra note 1, at 866. In the nineteenth century several
states adopted the Married Women's Property Acts or Emancipation Acts which
secured to the married woman the right to a separate legal estate. As a result,
woman's property was free of her husband's control. The various statutes permitted
the woman to contract for herself and also gave her the right to transfer her property.
Some statutes allowed her to secure her own earnings. Finally several statutes removed
the common law concept of unity of legal identity. Consequently, a wife could sue and
be sued without joining her husband as a party, thereby permitting a cause of action
between a husband and his wife. See McCurdy, supra note 7, at 1036-56.
81. See text accompanying notes 83-96 infra.
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soluteness of the parent-child tort immunity rule. In providing a
child with a cause of action against his parents under exceptional
circumstances, courts have reasoned that the parent often tem-
porarily abandons the parental relationship.2
Such abandonment of the parental relationship occurs when a
child is injured while in the parent's employ.13 By assuming the role
of an employer, the parent necessarily accepts all the respon-
sibilities of an employer. Included in these responsibilities is the
duty to provide reasonably safe working conditions.85 A breach of
this duty results in an employer's liability for the employee's in-
juries. Therefore, although the existence of a parental relationship
warrants the imposition of immunity in familial transactions, a child
injured while in the employ of a parent has a cause of action against
the parent arising from the separate and distinct employer-employee
relationship."8 In effect, the parent, while pursuing his business
endeavors, must temporarily abandon the parental relationship and
is no longer entitled to the immunity it provides.17
Abandonment of the parental relationship also occurs when a
parent's malicious and willful misconduct results in injury to a
child." Such conduct is not consistent with the duties and obliga-
tions inherent in the parental relationship but rather it destroys
that relationship by creating dissention among the family
members. 9 Due to its destructive nature, a parent's malicious and
82. Courts often are unwilling to overrule precedent. Rather than totally
abrogate the parent-child tort immunity rule, the court creates various exceptions
which "whittle the immunity down." See PROSSER, supra note 1, at 866.
83. Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 150 A. 905 (1930). In Dunlap, a child was
injured while acting as an employee of the father. However, other courts have allowed
a cause of action even where a child is not serving as an employee of the parent, so
long as the parent is performing a business transaction when he causes injury to the
child. See Signs v. Signs, 156 Ohio St. 592, 103 N.E.2d 743 (1952) (child burned when
father's gasoline pump exploded); Borst v. Borst, 41 Wash. 2d 149, 251 P.2d 149 (1952)
(father driving business vehicle ran over his son who was playing in the street).
84. Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. at 362, 150 A. at 915.
85. I&
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. See Emery v. Emery, 45 Cal. 2d 421, 289 P.2d 218 (1955) (parent's reckless
driving); Wright v. Wright, 85 Ga. App. 721, 70 S.E.2d 152 (1952) (parent driving while
intoxicated); Nudd v. Matsoukas, 7 Ill. 2d 608, 131 N.E.2d 525 (1956) (parent's reckless
driving); Mahnke v. Moore, 197 Md. 61, 77 A.2d 923 (1951) (father's murder of mother
and his suicide considered malicious and willful misconduct causing mental distress);
Harbin v. Harbin, 16 A.D.2d 696, 227 N.Y.S.2d 1023 (1961) (parent's reckless driving);
Cowgill v. Boock, 189 Or. 282, 218 P.2d 445 (1950) (parent's reckless driving).
89. Mahnke v. Moore, 197 Md. at 64, 77 A.2d at 926.
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willful misconduct constitutes a complete abandonment of the paren-
tal relationship. 0 Since immunity is a qualified privilege of the
parental relationship,91 it is illogical to provide immunity where a
parent has abandoned the parental relationship by acting in a
malicious manner. As a result several courts permit a child's action
in tort against a parent whose actions constitute malicious and
willful misconduct.
92
Additionally, several courts permit a child's tort action against
a deceased parent's estate93 as there is no practical reason for grant-
ing the deceased parent immunity. Since immunity from suit is only
a procedural bar to a child's cause of action based on public policy
and not on a lack of a violated duty,94 the procedural bar should no
longer operate to preclude the child's action in absence of the
underlying policy. Obviously, a parent's death eliminates reason for
preserving that particular parental relationship;" hence, in absence
of this underlying policy, immunity is no longer mandated.
Furthermore, the need to preserve the family peace is arguably
an insufficient policy consideration for granting a parent immunity
from the tort claims of his child. If preserving the family peace is a
valid consideration to deny the child a tort action against his
parents, it should also serve to bar similar actions in property and
contract law. However, courts have permitted a child to sue his
parents in property and contract actions. 6 Such inconsistent treat-
ment of a child is illogical and thereby weakens the rationale used in
preserving the parent-child tort immunity rule.
Those situations where courts have held a parent liable to his
child for tortious conduct have been referred to as exceptions to the
parent-child tort immunity rule. However, such classification is a
misnomer since a common law rule prohibiting a child's tort action
against his parent did not exist. 7 Rather, common law apparently
would permit a child's tort action against the parent for the same
90. Id
91. Id
92. See cases cited in note 88 supra.
93. The typical action involves an automobile collision in which the parent-
driver dies and the child receives injuries. See Davis v. Smith, 126 F. Supp. 497 (E.D.
Pa. 1954); Brennecke v. Kilpatrick, 336 S.W.2d 68 (Mo. 1960); Bahr v. Bahr, 478 S.W.2d
400 (Mo. 1972); Palcsey v. Tepper, 71 N.J. Super. 294, 176 A.2d 818 (1962).
94. Brennecke v. Kilpatrick, 336 S.W.2d at 73.
95. Id
96. See cases cited in note 21 supra.
97. Streenz v. Streenz, 106 Ariz. 86, 88, 471 P.2d 282, 284 (1970).
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reasons it permitted similar actions in property and contract. 8
Accordingly, the parent-child tort immunity rule represents the real
exception to common law." Those situations where immunity from
suit was removed to provide a child with a tort action against the
parent represent a return to common law. Recognizing this return
to common law, several jurisdictions have chosen to abrogate the
parent-child tort immunity rule, °0 reasoning that the prevalence of
liability insurance no longer necessitates immunity.'
While various courts have abolished parent-child tort immuni-
ty, each court grants immunity to the parent in certain cir-
cumstances to alleviate the parent's burden of rearing the child.0 2
However, to determine the granting of immunity under certain cir-
cumstances, the courts have diverged utilizing three different
methods: explicit provisions of immunity,"3 implicit provisions of im-
98. See cases cited in note 21 supra.
99. See note 69 supra and accompanying text.
100. See cases cited in note 5 supr.
101. Streenz v. Streenz, 106 Ariz. at 88, 471 P.2d at 284. While insurance is not
to be considered in determining the outcome of a particular cause of action, it is a valid
consideration in making a general policy decision to abolish parent-child tort immunity.
Accord, Hebel v. Hebel, 435 P.2d 8 (Alaska 1967); Gibson v. Gibson, 3 Cal. 3d 914, 479
P.2d 648, 92 Cal. Rptr. 288 (1971); Petersen v. City & County of Honolulu, 51 Hawaii
484, 462 P.2d 1007 (1970); Briere v. Briere, 107 N.H. 432, 234 A.2d 588 (1966); Goller v.
White, 20 Wis. 2d 402, 122 N.W.2d 193 (1963).
In Davis v. Smith, 126 F. Supp. 497 (E.D.. Pa. 1956), which permitted a child to
sue the deceased parent's estate, the court stated:
In reviewing the foregoing decisions a policy and trend in the law become
clear. Basically there is a feeling that injustice results from a broad and
complete application of the doctrine of parental immunity as a bar to any
suit against a parent for personal injury to the child. Confronted with a
large body of law based on the authority of Hewelett [sic], McKelvey and
Roller cases, the court must face with reluctance a decision to overrule
this heretofore established law. On the other hand, where right and equity
compel, it should not assist in perpetuating a doctrine which is, in large part
inhumane and unjust in our changing mode of life.
Id at 503.
102. See notes 106-10 infra and accompanying text.
103. In Goller v. White, 20 Wis. 2d 402, 122 N.W.2d 193 (1963), the court ex-
plicitly abolished parent-child tort immunity except in two situations: (1) where the
alleged negligent act involves an exercise of parental authority over the child; and (2)
where the alleged negligent act involves an exercise of ordinary parental discretion
with respect to the provision of food, clothing, housing, medical and dental services
and other care. Id. at 407, 122 N.W.2d at 198. Minnesota adopted the same provisions
with one modification. The court inserted the word "reasonable" into the first excep-
tion. Silesky v. Kelman, 281 Minn. 431, 161 N.W.2d 631 (1968). Similarily, Michigan also
adopted these provisions but inserted the word "reasonable" into both exceptions.
'Plumley v. Klein, 388 Mich. 1, 199 N.W.2d 169 (1972).
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munity and the reasonable parent standard."5 As a result, the
determination of what parental action or inaction constitutes
negligence is often difficult. This is especially true when the courts
are faced with the question of whether or not parents can be held
liable for negligent supervision.
NEGLIGENT PARENTAL SUPERVISION:
METHODS OF DETERMINATION
Whether a parent should have a legally recognizable duty to
adequately supervise a child is a problem which has confused those
courts which recognize a child's cause of action against a parent for
negligence. Since a parent is charged with the duty to rear a child,
the parent must afford a child the opportunities to gain in-
dependence and accept responsibility."' To accomplish this duty a
parent will permit a child to stray from his immediate physical
presence.0 7 Additionally, as the child grows older, a parent may per-
mit the child to ride a bicycle, or use various power tools, or drive
motorcycles or automobiles, all of which might be considered
dangerous instruments in the hands of a child."0 8 When a child is in-
jured while adventuring into this realm of independence and respon-
sibility, a court often must decide whether a child can maintain an
action against the parent for negligent supervision. Such a decision
requires that the court distinguish a parent's duty to rear a child,
for which immunity is granted,'0 9 from the parent's legal duty to pro-
tect a child from injury."0 As a practical matter, the child's age, ex-
perience and education and the parent's ability to foresee potential
dangers are factors which may be useful in determining the parent's
104. For examples of jurisdictions granting immunity implicitly, see Xaphes v.
Mossey, 224 F. Supp. 578 (D. Vt. 1963) (interpreting Vermont law); Petersen v. City &
County of Honolulu, 51 Hawaii 484, 462 P.2d. 1007 (1969); Schenk v. Schenk, 100 Ind.
App. 199, 241 N.E.2d 12 (1968); Nuelles v. Wells, 154 N.W.2d 364 (N.D. 1967); Briere v.
Briere, 107 N.H. 432, 224 A.2d 588 (1966); Gelbman v. Gelbman, 23 N.Y.2d 434, 245
N.E.2d 192, 297 N.Y.S.2d 529 (1969).
105. Gibson v. Gibson, 3 Cal. 3d 914, 479 P.2d 648, 92 Cal. Rptr. 288 (1971).
California is the only jurisdiction to adopt the "reasonable parent" standard.
106. See Nolechek v. Gesuale, 46 N.Y.2d 332, 338, 385 N.E.2d 1268, 1272, 413
N.Y.S.2d 340, 344 (1978).
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. See note 103 supreL
110. The primary legal responsibility for the protection of children rests upon
the parent. Gabel v. Koba, 1 Wash. App. 684, 463 P.2d 237 (1969). But see Holodook v.
Spencer, 36 N.Y.2d 35, 324 N.E.2d 338, 364 N.Y.S.2d 859 (1974), where the court re-
fused to recognize a legal duty to protect the child.
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liability for the child's injuries."' While these factors may be useful
in making such a determination, courts often use an inflexible stan-
dard which precludes the consideration of the special circumstances
of each case. As a result, courts often reach inconsistent and ineq-
uitable decisions when confronted with a child's action against a
parent for negligent supervision.
Negligent Supervision and The Explicit Provision of Immunity
Courts have explicitly provided a parent with immunity from a
child's cause of action "where he is exercising parental authority or
where he is exercising ordinary parental discretion with respect to
the provision of food, clothing, housing, medical and dental services
and other care."1 2 While several courts have concluded that this
wording includes a parental duty to supervise, thereby warranting
immunity, these courts have done so by classifying supervision as
parental authority"' on the one hand or as parental discretion... on
the other. Through the inconsistent application of these provisions
to the problem of negligent parental supervision, courts have failed
to provide a sufficient method for determining parental immunity in
those situations involving inadequate parental supervision.
Faced with the question of parental liability for inadequate
parental supervision, the Supreme Court of Michigan in Paige v.
Bing Construction Co., granted the parent immunity reasoning that
supervision was an element of parental authority. 5 According to the
court, parental authority was not limited to disciplinary matters, but
rather, it included providing instruction and education so that a
child may become aware of the surrounding dangers for his or her
well-being."' To provide this education a parent must permit the
111. See Convery v. Maczka, 163 N.J. Super. 411, 394 A.2d 1250 (1978).
112. Goller v. White, 20 Wis. 2d at 407, 122 N.W.2d at 198.
113. See notes 115-18 infra and accompanying text.
114. See notes 119-29 infra and accompanying text.
115. 61 Mich. App. at 482, 233 N.W.2d at 49. The case involved a two-and-one-
half-year-old child who died as a result of her injuries when she fell into a hole on the
third party's construction site. The parents filed a wrongful death action against the
third party. The third party counterclaimed against the parents for negligent supervi-
sion. The court dismissed the claim, denying an actionable tort for negligent supervi-
sion. Accord, Fritz v. Anderson, 148 N.J. Super. 68, 371 A.2d 833 (1977) (child falls into
excavation). But see Macey v. United States 454 F. Supp. 684 (D. Alaska 1978) (where
the court found the parents liable for negligent supervision when their four-year-old
child drowned in a partially excavated ditch even though a babysitter was watching
the child at the time).
116. 61 Mich. App. at 484, 233 N.W.2d at 48.
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child to adventure into the world without constant supervision."7
Since the absence of constant supervision is a means of providing
education, the Paige court reasoned that it was impossible to
distinguish between such general phenomena as authority and
supervision." 8 Hence, the Supreme Court of Michigan refused to
recognize a child's action against the parent for negligent supervi-
sion.
The Supreme Court of Minnesota also refused to recognize a
child's action against the parent in Cherry v. Cherry,"' where an
unattended infant incurred injury when she gnawed through an elec-
trical cord. However, unlike the Paige court which held that paren-
tal supervision was an element of parental authority,2 the court in
Cherry concluded that the use of an extension cord was an exercise
of ordinary parental discretion with respect to housing and other
care. '2 Since a parent was accorded immunity while exercising or-
dinary parental discretion with respect to housing and other care,'
the injured infant suffered uncompensated injuries.
In a like manner, the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Lemmen v.
Servais has interpreted the term "other care" to include the paren-
tal duty to supervise a child.' In Lemmen, a six-year-old child was
117. Nolechek v. Gesuale, 46 N.Y.2d at 338, 385 N.E.2d at 1268, 413 N.Y.S.2d
at 344.
118. 61 Mich. App. at 482, 233 N.W.2d at 49. Despite the changing nature of
society, a parent must still exercise parental discipline and control over the child. "[T]o
take a step which could unduly disturb and further erode the harmony of the family is
unwarranted considering the practical impossibility of logically distinguishing between
authority and supervision." Id.
119. 295 Minn. 93, 203 N.W.2d 352 (1972). In Cherry the mother witnessed the
eight-month-old infant chewing on the electrical cord. Rather than remove the cord
from the child's reach, the mother slapped the child on her hands and placed her back
onto the floor where she resumed gnawing on the cord.
120. See note 115 supra and accompanying text.
121. Cherry v. Cherry, 295 Minn. at 94, 203 N.W.2d at 353. Concededly, the
use of an extension cord is household apparatus and therefore related to housing.
However it is difficult to perceive how the use of an extension cord directly relates to
a parent's duty to provide a child with housing. Rather, it seems the court should have
considered whether the parent exercised ordinary discretion with respect to caring for
the child. It might be argued that placing a child into a foreseeably dangerous situa-
tion is not an act of ordinary parental discretion. See note 119 supra.
122. See note 103 supra.
123. 39 Wis. 2d 75, 158 N.W.2d 341 (1968). Although the court did not mention
negligent supervision, the facts are analogous to those of other cases where the court
considered the issue to be one of negligent supervision. See Holodook v. Spencer, 36
N.Y.2d 35, 324 N.E.2d 338, 364 N.Y.S.2d 859 (1974); Thoreson v. Milwaukee & Subur-
ban Transp. Co., 56 Wis. 2d 231, 201 N.W.2d 745 (1972).
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struck by an automobile when she attempted to cross the street.12"
Broadly interpreting the term "other care" to include a parent's
duty to instruct the child as to the proper manner of crossing a
street, the Lemmen court granted immunity to the parent.1 15 Fur-
thermore, the court suggested that a parent might be liable for a
child's injuries if it could be established that the parent was in im-
mediate control of a child who was too young to care for his own
safety. 28 However, a parent is not required to do the impossible to
protect a child;"2 rather, the parent must provide reasonable care
and protection as an ordinary prudent person would deem
necessary.'28 Since the parent was exercising ordinary discretion
with respect to the provision of other care, the Lemmen court con-
cluded that no action could be maintained between the parent and
the child."'
Contrary to the holding in Lemmen,M the Supreme Court of
Wisconsin in Thoreson v. Milwaukee & Suburban Transport Co., s'
recognized an actionable tort for negligent supervision. While the
Lemmen court interpreted broadly the term "other care" to include
the parent's duty to supervise,"2 the court in Thoreson limited
"other care" to include only those acts which constitued exercises of
ordinary parental discretion with respect to providing a child with
the necessities of life.' 3 Acts of upbringing, whether in the nature of
supervision or education, are not acts which involve providing a
child with the necessities of life.34 Additionally, the court in
Thoreson rejected the rationale of the Paige courtM by limiting the
exercise of parental authority to include only the parent's right to
discipline the child."' According to the Thoreson court, parental
124. 39 Wis. 2d 75, 158 N.W.2d 341.
125. Id. at 77, 158 N.W. 2d at 343 (quoting 39 AM. JUR. Parent and Child § 46
(1942)).
126. Id
127. Id
128. Id.
129. Id. at 77, 158 N.W.2d at 344.
130. See note 123 supra and accompanying text.
131. 56 Wis. 2d 231. 201 N.W.2d 745 (1972). In Thoreson a three-year-old boy
was struck by a bus when he ran into the street from between two parked cars. The
parents sued. The jury found the bus company sixty percent negligent and the parents
forty percent negligent for failing to adequately supervise their child. Damages were
apportioned according to the jury's determination of negligence.
132. See notes 115-18 supra and accompanying text.
133. 56 Wis. 2d at 239, 201 N.W.2d at 753.
134. Id
135. See notes 115-18 supra and accompanying text.
136. 56 Wis. 2d at 239, 201 N.W.2d at 753.
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supervision is not an exercise of parental authority, nor is it an ex-
ercise of ordinary parental discretion with respect to the provision
of food, clothing, housing, medical and dental services, and other
care. 37 Therefore, the court held that a child may maintain an action
against a parent for negligent supervision."
Those jurisdictions which provide immunity to the parent
where his act constitutes an exercise of parental authority or an ex-
ercise of ordinary parental discretion with respect to the provision
of food, clothing, housing, medical and dental services, and other
care, have inconsistently responded to the question of negligent
supervision." 9 Such inconsistency may be explained by the courts'
inability to interpret the ambiguous immunity provisions." ' While
the Thoreson court has salvaged these provisions through narrow
interpretation,"' several courts remain perplexed in determining
whether or not a child's action for negligence should be recognized.
Negligent Supervision: Implied Immunity
While some jurisdictions have adopted express provisions of
immunity," 2 others have implicitly granted immunity to the parent
where this duty arises exclusively from the family relationship."
3
Those jurisdictions which implicitly grant immunity to the parent
137. Id. The Thoreson court utilized the statutory construction rule of ejusdem
generis. This rule provides that "where general words follow words of particular and
specific meaning, the general words should not be construed to their widest extent but
should be held to apply to the same general kind of things specifically mentioned."
Schmidt v. United States, 369 F. Supp. 64 (E.D. Wis. 1974) (the court recognized
negligent supervision as a tort). Accord, Cole v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 47 Wis. 2d 629,
177 N.W.2d 866 (1970).
138. Thoreson v. Milwaukee & Suburban Transp. Co., 56 Wis. 2d at 239, 201
N.W.2d at 753.
139. In Paige the court denied an action for negligent supervision reasoning
that negligent supervision is an element of parental authority, thereby warranting im-
munity. 61 Mich. App. at 482, 233 N.W.2d at 49. Denying the same cause of action, the
court in Cherry concluded that the parent was exercising ordinary parental discretion
with respect to the provision of housing and other care. 295 Minn. at 94, 203 N.W.2d at
353. While the Lemmen court does not specifically mention negligent supervision it too
would deny the action reasoning that negligent supervision is included in the term
other care. See note 123 supra and accompanying text. Finally, the Thoreson court
permitted an action for negligent supervision. 56 Wis. 2d at 239, 201 N.W.2d at 753.
These inconsistencies indicate that the explicit provisions adopted by these courts are
inappropriate guidelines for determining whether or not negligent supervision should
constitute an actionable tort.
140. See note 139 supra.
141. See notes 135-38 supra and accompanying text.
142. See note 103 supra.
143. See note 104 supra.
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where it has been alleged that the parent failed to adequately super-
vise his child have done so inconsistently. New York is represen-
tative of a jurisdiction which inconsistently grants immunity to the
parent in actions alleging negligent supervision.
Illustrative of New York's refusal to recognize a child's action
for negligent supervision is Holodook v. Spencer."' In Holodook a
four-and-one-half-year-old child was struck by an automobile driven
by a third party.' 5 Although this case is factually similar to
Thoreson,"' the court in Holodook rejected the Thoreson court's nar-
row application of an immunity provision. " Instead, the Holodook
court liberally granted immunity to the parent reasoning that the
law should not venture into the realm of duties which arise ex-
clusively from the family relationship.' Comparing Thoreson 9 and
Holodook'w it is clear that the state of the law regarding a legally
recognizable parental duty to supervise a child is in conflict. Thus,
an examination of the policy considerations advanced by the
Holodook court might be useful in determining whether an action-
able tort for negligent parental supervision should exist.
One consideration advanced by the Holodook court to deny an
actionable tort for negligent supervision is that such an action would
place an unreasonable burden upon the parent. 5' Indeed, a child
could probably avoid most injuries were he under a parent's con-
stant supervision. 5 ' Thus, the court in Holodook suggested that each
144. 36 N.Y.2d 35, 324 N.E.2d 338, 364 N.Y.S.2d 859 (1974). Holodook is a con-
solidation of three cases: Holodook v. Spencer, 43 A.D.2d 129, 350 N.Y.S.2d 199 (1974)
(child struck by a car); Ryan v. Fahey, 43 A.D.2d 429, 352 N.Y.S.2d 283 (1974) (child run
over by a lawn mower); Graney v. Graney, 43 A.D.2d 207, 350 N.Y.S.2d 207 (1973)
(child fell from a slide).
145. 36 N.Y.2d 35, 324 N.E.2d 338, 364 N.Y.S.2d 859.
146. See note 131 supra. In each case a child darted out into the street from
between two parked cars and was struck by an on-coming vehicle driven by a third
party. Both actions were brought against the third party for negligence. While the
court in Thoreson allowed the third party to recover a judgment against the parent for
contribution, as the parents were negligent in supervising their child, the court in
Holodook refused to recognize an actionable tort for negligent supervision whereby
the court denied the claim for contribution.
147. See notes 136-37 supra and accompanying text.
148. 36 N.Y.2d at 45, 324 N.E.2d at 343, 364 N.Y.S.2d at 867.
149. See note 131 supra.
150. See note 144 supra.
151. 36 N.Y.2d at 45, 324 N.E.2d at 343, 364 N.Y.S.2d at 867. See note 154 in-
fra.
152. Holodook v. Spencer, 36 N.Y.2d at 45, 324 N.E.2d at 343, 364 N.Y.S.2d at
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time a child is injured, there is a strong possibility that the parent
will be called into court either by the child or by a third party who
is seeking to recover a judgment against the parent for
contribution.5 ' According to the court, calling a parent into court
each time a child sustains injuries would hinder a parent's ability to
effectively rear his child and would require a parent to unreasonably
waste his time answering frivolous claims.' Since an actionable tort
for negligent supervision would provide a claim whereby an injured
child or a third party could automatically require a parent to appear
in court, the Holodook court denied the tort action. 55
As a practical matter, a parent will not be called into court
each time his child is injured. Rather, a child will be reluctant to
bring a cause of action against his parent for negligent supervision
due to the natural ties of affection that bind the family unit.", Also,
because a child is subject to parental control, the parent has the
power to hinder the child's action. 157 Since the characteristics in-
herent in a cohesive family relationship will provide sufficient con-
trols on the number of direct actions brought by a child against his
parent for negligent supervision, it is unlikely that a parent will be
required to appear in court each time his child is injured.
Additionally, where a third party injures a child, a court will
often appoint the parent as guardian ad litem to prosecute the
child's action against the third party." Consequently, when the
third party files a complaint against the parent alleging negligent
supervision, no unreasonable burden is placed on the parent as it is
likely that they have initiated the prosecution of the child's claim.' 59
153. Id.
154. If each time a child was injured a parent could be held liable for his in-
juries due to a failure to supervise, then a parent might be coerced into providing ex-
cessive supervision. The overall effect of this tort action would be to suppress the
parents' ability to rear the child. See Cannon v. Cannon, 287 N.Y. 425, 40 N.E.2d 236
(1942). Failure to adequately supervise a child does not mean a parent would be held
liable each time his child is injured since negligence would have to be proven. Surely
the court recognized this. Therefore, by implication the court probably did not want a
parent to be called into court each time a child is injured as this would unreasonably
waste his time.
155. 36 N.Y.2d 51, 324 N.E.2d 346, 364 N.Y.S.2d 871.
156. Id at 52, 324 N.E.2d at 347, 364 N.Y.S.2d at 872 (Jasen, J., dissenting).
Accord, Lastowski v. Norge Coin-O-Matic, Inc., 44 A.D.2d 127, 141, 355 N.Y.S.2d 432,
446 (1974) (Hopkins, J., dissenting).
157. See note 146 supra.
158. E.g., Petersen v. City & County of Honolulu, 51 Hawaii 484, 462 P.2d 1007
(1969); Stasky v. Bernardon, 81 Misc. 2d 1067, 367 N.Y.S.2d 449 (Sup. Ct. 1975);
Hairston v. Broadwater, 73 Misc. 2d 523, 342 N.Y.S.2d 787 (Sup. Ct. 1973).
159. See note 158 supra for a few, of many, examples.
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Instead, an unreasonable burden is placed on the third party who
cannot recover a judgment against the parents for contribution.1 "'
This financial burden is even more unreasonable if the third party is
only slightly negligent as he may be held totally liable for the child's
injuries.' Such a result runs counter to the evolution in our law
toward a system of comparative fault.'62 Thus, courts should
recognize an actionable tort for negligent supervision, rather than
deny the tort as creating an unreasonable burden on the parent.
Besides the unreasonable burden on the parent, the Holodook
court denied the child's action since a claim for negligent super-
vision could result in the parent's failure to prosecute a child's cause
of action against a third party.6 Since creating an action for
negligent supervision would provide a third party with a means to
recover a judgment against the parent for contribution, the court
determined that an uninsured parent might be reluctant to assert
160. Where two tortfeasors cause a single injury the plaintiff can sue either
tortfeasor for the total amount of damages.
There is obviously a lack of sense and justice in rule which permits the
entire burden of a loss to be shouldered onto one alone according to the
accident of a successful levy of execution, the existence of liability, the
plaintiffs whim or spite or this collusion with the other wrongdoer, while
the latter goes scot-free.
PROSSER, supra note 1, at 307.
161. Id.
162. Twenty-nine states have enacted some form of a comparative negligence
statute. ARK STAT. ANN. §§ 27-1763 to 27-1765 (1979); COLO. REV. STAT. § 23-21-111
(Supp. 1979); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-572h (West Supp. 1980); GA. CODE ANN. §
105-603 (Supp. 1980); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 663-31 (1976); IDAHO CODE §§ 6-801, 6-802
(1979); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-258a (1976); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14 § 156 (1980);
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231 § 185 (West Supp. 1980-81); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604.01
(West Supp. 1980); MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-7-15 (1972); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 58-607.1
(Supp. 1977); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1151 (1979); NEV. REV. STAT. 41.141 (1979); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 507:7a (Supp. 1977); N.J. STAT. ANN. 2A: 15-5.1 to 2A: 15-5.3 (West Supp.
1980-81; N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW. § 1411 (McKinney 1976); N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-10-07
(1975); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23 § 13 (West Supp. 1979-80); OR. REV. STAT. § 18.470
(1979); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 42 § 7102 (Purdon 1980); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-20-4
(Supp. 1978); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 20-9-2 (1979); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art.
2212a (Vernon Supp. 1980); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-37 (1977); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12 §
1036 (Supp. 1980); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.22-010 (Supp. 1980-81); WIS. STAT. ANN. §
895.045 (West. Supp. 1979-80); and WYO. STAT. § 1-1-109 (West 1977).
In addition five states have adopted comparative negligence through judicial
action. They are Alaska, Kaatz v. State, 540 P.2d 1037 (Alaska 1975); California, Li v.
Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975); Florida, Hoff-
man v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973); Michigan, Placek v. City of Sterling Heights,
405 Mich. 638, 275 N.W.2d 511 (1979); and West Virginia, Bradley v. Appalachian
Power Co., 256 S.E.2d 879 (W. Va. 1979).
163. 36 N.Y.2d at 46, 324 N.E.2d at 344, 364 N.Y.S.2d at 868.
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his child's right to collect damages from the third party.16' This
reluctance to prosecute a child's claim results from the uninsured
parent's fear of a third party's retaliatory claim for contribution
which could result in an out of pocket payment by the uninsured
parent."' Ultimately, the net effect of allowing a contribution claim
for negligent supervision could result in a detriment to the child, as
he might suffer his injuries uncompensated.' Recognizing this
potential detriment to the child, the Holodook court refused to pro-
vide a third party with a retaliatory action against the parent for
negligent supervision." 7
Concededly, an uninsured parent might be reluctant to assert a
child's claim against the third party fearing a potential claim for
contribution. However, such an occurrence is credible only if it is
assumed that the third party is more likely to be insured than the
parent."'6 Although the third party is likely to have liability in-
surance, it is equally probable that the parent might have an in-
surance policy which would protect him from potential financial
harm resulting from the third party's claim for contribution.'69 Due
to the prevalence of liability insurance, it is illogical to assume that
a third party is more likely to have insurance than the parent of an
injured child. As a result, it is likely that most parents will eagerly
prosecute their child's claims regardless of the possibility of a third
party's retaliatory claim for contribution.
The court in Holodook also argued that a tort for negligent
supervision could ultimately reduce the amount of damages a child
might recover from a third-party tortfeasor.Y7 Normally when a
child recovers money damages from a third party, the court will ap-
point a guardian of the property for the child.' This guardian will
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 51, 324 N.E.2d at 346, 364 N.Y.S.2d at 872.
168. The court in Holodook stated that "the net effect of allowing . . . appor-
tionment could well be the parent's failure to seek legal redress on the child's behalf
against third parties who are more likely than the parent in these cases to have ap-
propriate liability coverage." Id. at 46, 324 N.E.2d at 344, 364 N.Y.S.2d at 868.
169. Id. at 53, 324 N.E.2d at 348, 364 N.Y.S.2d at 873 (Jasen, J., dissenting).
Accord, Lastowski v. Norge Coin-O-Matic, Inc., 44 A.D.2d at 145, 355 N.Y.S.2d at 449
(Hopkins, J., dissenting).
170. Holodook v. Spencer, 36 N.Y.S.2d at 47, 324 N.E.2d at 344, 364 N.Y.S.2d
at 868.
171. See, e.g., N.Y. SURR. CT. PROC. ACT. § 1701 (McKinney Supp. 1978-79),
which provides: "The court has power over the property of an infant and is authorized
and empowered to appoint a guardian of the person or of the property or of both of
the infant whether or not the parent or parents of the infant are living."
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usually be the parent, as he is the child's natural guardian. 7 ' While
it is illegal for the parent to appropriate the child's damage award
for his own use, 73 it is conceivable that the parent could divert
funds from the child's damage award in order to satisfy a third-
party's judgment for contribution. In effect, the child's damage
award would be reduced.
However, courts have the power to prevent a parent's diver-
sion of funds from the child's damage award by placing the award in
a trust and appointing a non-parental trustee.174 This procedural
action creates a separate economic identity for the child. As such,
the corpus of the trust is protected from parental encroachment.'75
Creating a trust with a non-parental trustee not only would secure
full compensation for an injured child, but it would also provide an
effective means whereby courts could apportion damages between
the negligent third party and the negligent parent.
Finally, the Holodook court analogized its denial of an
actionable tort for negligent supervision to New York's General
Obligations Law,17 the statute abolishing the old rule of imputed
negligence. 77 Pursuant to the imputed negligence rule, a child could
not maintain an action against a third-party tortfeasor where the
third party could prove the parent was contributorily negligent in
172. Id
173. While a parent may be the natural legal guardian of the child, that does
not make him the legal guardian of the child's property. Damages for injury to a
child's person belong to the child and it is illegal for a parent to divert them to his own
use. See Weiand v. City of Akron, 13 Ohio App. 2d 73, 233 N.E.2d 880 (1968).
174. "Separate guardianship and trust accounts under judicial scrutiny are the
legal protection for infants so that damages awarded for their pain and suffering are
not invaded to pay the parents' debt." Hairston v. Broadwater, 73 Misc. 2d at 531, 342
N.Y.S.2d at 794-95 ("[A]ny property to which an infant or a person judicially declared
to be incompetent is entitled, after deducting any expenses allowed by the court, shall
be distributed to the guardian of his property ... to be held for the use and benefit of
such infant or incompetent.") (construing N.Y. CIv. PRAC. LAW § 1206 (McKinney
1976)).
175. Hairston v. Broadwater, 73 Misc. 2d at 531, 342 N.Y.S.2d at 794-95.
176. N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 3-111 (McKinney 1978), provides that: "In an ac-
tion brought by an infant to recover damages for personal injury the contributory
negligence of the infant's parent or other custodian shall not be imputed to the infant."
177. The rule of imputed negligence had its origin in Hartfield v. Roper, 21
Wend. 615 (N.Y. 1839). In Hartfield, a two year old was injured when she was run over
by a sleigh driven by the defendant. The court found the parents negligent for failing
to look after their child. Such action on the part of the parents constituted con-
tributory negligence. Since the parents' negligence was imputed to the child, the child
could not recover for her damages.
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failing to adequately supervise a child.178 The court in Holodook
determined that by abrogating the imputed negligence rule, the
legislature intended to discard the actionable tort for negligent
supervision. 179 In accordance with its determination of the
legislature's intent, the Holodook court refused to recognize an
actionable tort for negligent parental supervision. 8 '
In its determination of the legislative intent underlying the
New York General Obligations Law,' the Holodook court ignored
other practical considerations for abrogating the imputed negligence
rule. The old rule which imputed a parent's contributory negligence
to the injured child thus barring his cause of action coexisted with
the parent-child tort immunity rule.'82 Accordingly, if a child's claim
against a negligent third party was barred where the parent was
contributorily negligent, the child would go uncompensated as the
parent-child tort immunity rule barred the child's subsequent claim
against the parent."3 Since parent-child tort immunity already
precluded a child's action for negligent supervision, it is illogical to
assume that the legislature abolished imputed negligence to further
deny a cause of action for negligent supervision. Rather, it would ap-
pear that the legislature abolished the imputed negligence rule to
permit a child to recover damages for injuries previously denied by
the parent-child tort immunity rule.' Ultimately, abrogation of the
178. Id.
179. 36 N.Y.2d at 48, 324 N.E.2d at 345, 364 N.Y.S.2d at 869.
180. Id at 51, 324 N.E.2d at 346, 364 N.Y.S.2d at 872.
181. See note 176 supra.
182. Imputed negligence originated in the year 1839 and lasted until 1935. See
Novak v. State, 199 Misc. 588, 99 N.Y.S.2d 962 (Ct. Cl. 1950). Parent-child tort immun-
ity existed in New York until its abrogation in 1969. See Gelbman v. Gelbman, 23
N.Y.2d 434, 245 N.E.2d 192, 297 N.Y.S.2d 529 (1969).
183. In rejecting the imputed negligence rule, the court in Neff v. City of
Cameron, 213 Mo. 350,-111 S.W. 1139 (1908), stated:
Imputed negligence is an attempt to incorporate into the law of this land
as legal precepts the sayings that the sins of the fathers are visited upon
their children, and that the child's teeth must be set on edge because the
father has eaten sour grapes. But the whole doctrine of imputed
negligence has been thoroughly exploded as heresy ever was. It was
originally founded on . . . fiction of the law that one in whose care the in-
fant is, is its keeper and agent and in respect to third persons his act
must be deemed that of the infant, his negligence the infant's negligence.
But the theory of agency is flatly unsound .... It is elementary in the
common law that one who has suffered wrong may have his amends, in-
demnity or reparation from anyone participating in that wrong.
Id. at 360, 111 S.W. at 1141.
184. See note 185 supra and accompanying text.
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imputed negligence rule enables a child to collect damages for his in-
juries.'" Thus, if the Holodook court wanted to act in accordance
with the legislative intent underlying the New York General Obliga-
tions Law, which arguably enables a child to recover damages for
his injuries,'" the court should have promulgated an actionable tort
for negligent supervision.
While the Holodook court absolutely barred a child's direct
cause of action against the parent for negligent supervision,'87 recent
New York court decisions apparently have recognized an action for
negligent supervision in order to provide an assertable claim to a
third-party tortfeasor.lu These recent New York decisions are based
upon certain judicially created distinctions designed to disguise the
claim for negligent supervision which Holodook prohibited. As a
result, the New York courts have arbitrarily determined parental
liability depending upon whether a child directly brings the action,
or whether a third-party tortfeasor is seeking contribution from the
parent.'89 These arbitrary determinations have further confused the
issue of what parental inaction amounts to negligent supervision.
Illustrative of a court's arbitrary determination of a parent's
liability for his child's injuries is Goedkoop v. Ward Pavement Co. 9
In Goedkoop, the defendant, a third party engaged in construction,
allowed explosives to remain on the construction site.19" ' A child
found some of these explosives and removed them to his home. 9'
Upon the child's arrival, the father immediately confiscated the ex-
plosives and placed them in a jar in the basement.'93 Two years
later, the child found the explosives and was injured when he at-
tempted to puncture them with a sharp instrument. 4 The court sus-
tained a counterclaim by the third party reasoning that the duty not
to negligently maintain explosives is a duty which is owed to the
whole world. 9' Since the duty not to negligently maintain explosives
185. See note 176 supra.
186. Id.
187. 36 N.Y.2d 51, 324 N.E.2d 346, 364 N.Y.S.2d 872.
188. See notes 190-211 infra and accompanying text.
189. See text at note 218 infra.
190. 51 A.D.2d 542, 378 N.Y.S.2d 417 (1976).
191. Id at 543, 378 N.Y.S.2d at 418.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 543, 378 N.Y.S.2d at 418-19.
194. Id. at 543, 378 N.Y.S.2d at 419.
195. Id. The court apparently adopted the language used by Justice Andrews
in his famous dissenting opinion in Palsgraf v. Long Island Ry. Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 162
N.E. 99 (1928):
Everyone owes to the world at large, the duty of refraining from those
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was a duty owed to the whole world and not simply arising from the
family relationship, the court concluded an actionable tort existed
between the child and the parent. Thus, the court in Goedkoop sus-
tained the counterclaim.'"
Although the court in Goedkoop recognized an actionable tort
between the parent and the child to permit the third party's
counterclaim, it is conceivable that the court could have denied a
child's 'direct cause of action against the parent absent a parental
duty to supervise a child. The real distinction between a "beyond
the family duty" approach and the Holodook "failure to supervise"
exception is whether the parent is directly responsible for the
child's injuries, or whether he simply permits the child to be in a
position to harm himself or others.197 If the parent actively starts
the forces in motion which directly cause injury to the child, then
the court should impose liability upon the parent on the basis that
the duty was owed to the whole world and beyond the family duty.198
On the other hand, if the parent simply permits the child to be in a
position to do harm to himself and the child's own conduct causes
his injury, then the court should refuse to impose liability as there
is no parental duty to supervise the child.'99
Applying this distinction to the facts of Goedkoop it is possible
that the court could have denied the child's direct action against the
parent utilizing a Holodook rationale."0 Since the child removed the
acts that may unreasonably threaten the safety of others. Such an act oc-
curs. Not only is he wronged to whom harm might reasonably be ex-
pected to result, but he also who is in fact injured, even if he be outside
what would generally be thought the danger zone.
Id at 350, 162 N.E. at 103.
196. 51 A.D.2d at 543, 378 N.Y.S.2d at 419.
197. Hurst v. Titus, 99 Misc. 2d 205, 415 N.Y.S.2d 770 (Sup. Ct. 1979). In Hurst
the court sets out the guidelines for determining what actions are negligent super-
vision as opposed to those which involve a duty owed to the whole world. The court at-
taches liability only if the duty is one owed to the whole world. See notes 198-99 infra
and accompanying text.
198. Id. at 210, 415 N.Y.S.2d at 774.
199. Holodook v. Spencer, 36 N.Y.2d 35, 324 N.E.2d 338, 364 N.Y.S.2d 859.
200. See notes 201-02 infra and accompanying text. The court in Hurst set up
the following hypothetical as exemplifying what parental action constitutes super-
vision:
[I]n this case the child's burns had been caused because the mother had
carelessly allowed the child to play with matches or unthinkedly had left
the matches so close to the playpen that the child could reach and ignite
them, then clearly there would be a failure to supervise situation which
would fall within the Holodook law.
99 Misc. 2d at 209-10, 415 N.Y.S.2d at 773.
This hypothetical situation is analogous to the facts of Goedkoop. In both situa-
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explosives to his home, it was the child who started the injurious
forces in motion. 1 Moreover, the father merely permitted the child
to be in a position of danger by allowing him to enter the basement
where the explosives were stored. By attempting to puncture the
explosives, the child directly caused his own injury. 2 In effect, the
parent was passive while the child acted causing his own injuries.
Accordingly, if the court applied the Holodook "failure to adequately
supervise" exception,2 3 it might have denied a child's direct action
against the parent.
The Goedkoop decision is illustrative of the court's ability to
arbitrarily determine liability. In determining liability, a court can
arrive at opposite conclusions depending upon whether it uses the
"beyond the family duty" approach or the Holodook "failure to
supervise" exception.!0 4 By recognizing an actionable tort between
the parent and the child in order to provide the third party with an
assertible claim, the Goedkoop court demonstrated its disapproval of
an absolute bar to actions for negligent supervision.
Consistent with the Goedkoop court's disapproval of the ab-
solute bar on actions for negligent supervision is the court's decision
in Nolechek v. Gesuale.0 5 In Nolechek a parent entrusted his partial-
ly blinded child with a motorcycle.2 0 While riding the motorcycle,
the child ran into a steel cable which had been placed across a
private road by the defendant, a third party. 7 As a result of the ac-
cident, the child died."° The court refused to recognize a parental
duty owed to the child,2°9 but nevertheless, it recognized that a
tions the parent acted passively while the child actively produced his own injury.
Unlike Goedkoop, Hurst would grant immunity in the hypothetical situation since the
parent's action constituted a failure to supervise.
201. See notes 191-94 supra and accompanying text.
202. Rather than directly causing the child's injury the father acted to protect
the child. Even if the court considered his actions an intervening cause, thereby set-
ting the injurious forces in motion, the father could not be liable unless his conduct
created or increased an unreasonable risk of harm. See PROSSER, supra note 1, at 275.
203. See notes 197-99 supra. The Holodook failure to adequately supervise ex-
ception means that the court will grant immunity to the parent where a child injures
himself, even though the parent permitted him to be in a dangerous position.
204. See notes 197-99 supra.
205. 46 N.Y.2d 332, 385 N.E.2d 1268, 413 N.Y.S.2d 340 (1978).
206. Id. at 337, 385 N.E.2d at 1271, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 343.
207. Id
208. Id.
209. The court reasoned that Holodook bars a child's cause of action against
the parent where a child is injured when his parent negligently entrusts him with a
dangerous instrument. "[Dieciding whether to permit a minor to use a dangerous in-
strument whether it be a motorcycle, bow and arrow, a knife, a hammer or even a pen-
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parent who entrusts a child with a dangerous instrumentality owes
a duty to third parties to protect them from injury. 0 According to
the Nolechek court, although the third party suffered no direct
physical injury, he did suffer financial harm resulting from potential
liability for the child's death."' Since the parent caused this poten-
tial financial harm by entrusting his child with a dangerous instru-
ment, the Nolechek court concluded that the parent was liable to
the third party.2 '
By finding liability in the absence of an actual injury, an essen-
tial element of any negligence action,'1 3 the Nolechek court has
created a new tort. In order to maintain an action for negligence,
one must show a legally recognizable duty and a breach of that duty
which results in actual loss or damage."" The mere threat of finan-
cil is as much an element of parental supervision as is the decision to monitor a child's
play activity more or less closely." Id. at 337, 385 N.E.2d at 1271, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 344.
Accord, Lampman v. Cairo Cent. School Dist. 81 Misc. 2d 395, 366 N.Y.S.2d 579 (1975).
But see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 390 (1965), which provides:
One who supplies directly or through a third person a chattel for the use
of another whom the supplier knows or has reason to know to be likely
because of his youth, inexperience, or otherwise to use it in a manner in-
volving unreasonable risk of physical harm to himself and others when
the supplier should expect to share in or be endangered by its use, is sub-
ject to liability for physical harm resulting to them.
Comment C of this section suggests that the supplier might be liable to the incompe-
tent to whom he entrusted the chattel.
210. The court reasoned that a motorcyle is a dangerous instrument in the
hands of a partially blind child. 46 N.Y.2d at 341, 385 N.E.2d at 1274, 413 N.Y.S.2d at
346.
211. Id. at 339, 385 N.E.2d at 1272, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 345.
212. The court drew an analogy to workmen's compensation "where a third
party tortfeasor may implead for contribution or indemnity the employer of an insured
employee, despite the employee's inability to recover from the employer directly." Id.
at 339, 385 N.E.2d at 1273, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 345. However, the analogy fails in that
workmen's compensation is a statutorily created exclusive remedy. Id. at 349, 385
N.E.2d at 1278, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 351 (Cooke, J., dissenting).
Another situation in which the courts apparently have recognized a duty of the
parents to supervise the child occurs when a parent files a derivative lawsuit to
recover medical expenses and damages for loss of consortium resulting from his child's
injuries. The courts have held that while a child has no direct cause of action against
the parent since there is no duty to supervise, a failure to adequately supervise a child
may bar the parent's derivative lawsuit. See Juszczak v. City of New York, 32 A.D.2d
824, 302 N.Y.S.2d 375 (1969). Accord, Dean v. Holland, 76 Misc. 2d 517, 350 N.Y.S.2d
859 (Sup. Ct. 1973); Hairston v. Broadwater, 73 Misc. 2d 523, 342 N.Y.S.2d 787 (Sup. Ct.
1973).
213. See PROSSER, supra note 1, at 143. Accord, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 218 (1965).
214. See PROSSER, supra note 1, at 143. Accord, Northern Pacific R.R. v.
Lewis, 162 U.S. 366 (1896).
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cial harm not yet realized is insufficient to constitute an actual in-
jury. 15 While the parent in Nolechek may have breached a legally
recognizable duty by entrusting his son with a dangerous instru-
ment, the third party suffered no actual injury. In accordance with
basic tort law which requires actual injury in all negligence actions,
the Nolechek court should have dismissed the third party's counter-
claim.
The decisions reached by the courts in Nolechek and Goedkoop
are illustrative of methods utilized by the courts to circumvent the
absolute bar to a claim for negligent supervision as promulgated by
the Holodook court. While the Goedkoop court sustained a third-
party counterclaim, reasoning that an actionable tort existed be-
tween a parent and his child,21 the court in Nolechek sustained the
counterclaim reasoning that the third party could have maintained a
direct action against the parent."7 Regardless of their reasoning,
both courts demonstrated their disapproval of the Holodook court's
absolute bar to a claim for negligent supervision. Perhaps the
Nolechek court was a bit ironic when it stated that "the sound rule
of the Holodook case survives only if accompanied by sound excep-
tions."2 ' Nevertheless, the Holodook bar to an action survives, but
the courts should not be loathe to find the parent independently
liable to a third party who becomes the victim of admittedly
negligent conduct between a parent and child."'
Courts have denied a child a direct cause of action against his
parent for negligent supervision reasoning that such a duty arises
exclusively from the family relationship." The objective of supervis-
ing a child is "the fostering of physical, emotional, and intellectual
development."'" Considering the unique characteristics of each family,
215. See Lincoln First Bank of Rochester v. Barstro & Assoc. Contracting,
Inc., 49 A.D.2d 1025, 374 N.Y.S.2d 485 (1975), which states:
The law does not fasten liability on mere threats, annoyances, or petty
oppressions or other trivial incidents which must necessarily be expected
and are incidental to modern life no matter how upsetting. It is only
where the conduct complained of is of such a character as to exceed all
reasonable bounds of decency that the law will recognize it as an ac-
tionable tort.
Id. at 1026, 374 N.Y.S.2d at 487.
216. See note 196 supra and accompanying text.
217. See note 212 supra and accompanying text.
218. 46 N.Y.2d at 341, 385 N.E.2d at 1274, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 346.
219. Hurst v. Titus, 99 Misc.2d at 208, 415 N.Y.S.2d at 773.
220. Holodook v. Spencer, 36 N.Y.2d 35, 324 N.E.2d 338, 364 N.Y.S.2d 859
(1974).
221. Id. at 50, 324 N.E.2d at 346, 364 N.Y.S.2d at 871.
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courts are reluctant to interfere with the parental means to achieve the
objective of supervision.T However, a parent does have the duty to see
that the child does not behave in a manner which ultimately might
result in his injury."2 Accordingly, when a parent permits a child to
face dangers which he cannot appreciate, the parent has effectively
negligently supervised the child and should be held liable for his
child's injuries.22 '
Recognizing an action for negligent supervision does not mean
that a parent will be liable to the child for each injury he sustains.225
Rather, liability should be imposed only if it can be determined that
the parent breached his duty to adequately supervise his child. In
determining whether a duty to supervise exists, the jury should con-
sider the child's age, experience, training, judgment, the likelihood
of the child recognizing the risk of injury to himself, and its ob-
viousness or reasonable foreseeability to the parent.220
The Reasonable Parent Standard
It must be conceded that a parent needs a wide range of discre-
tion in rearing his children. Obviously a parent must be able to im-
pose reasonable discipline on a misbehaving child and must be allowed
discretion to provide a child with food, clothing, housing, medical
and dental care. 7 Meanwhile, a child should be allowed to assume
various responsibilities so that he may gain independence and
222. Kay v. Ludwick, 87 Ill. App. 2d 114, 230 N.E.2d 494 (1967).
223. Id.
224. In Convery v. Maczka, 163 N.J. Super. 411, 394 A.2d 1250 (1978), a child
broke his arm when he jumped off a chair while playing in a neighbor's basement. Both
his mother and the neighbor were upstairs at the time of the injury. The child brought
an action against the neighbor and his mother. The court sustained the action against
both defendants reasoning that the child's action against the mother paralleled the ac-
tion against the neighbor. According to the court, each defendant stood in a special
relationship to the child arising out of a duty to exercise reasonable care for the child's
protection against unreasonable risk of injury. Each defendant breached that duty by
failing to warn or otherwise protect the child.
The special relationship referred to by the court has been recognized in other
situations where a person is charged with custody of a minor child. People standing in
this relationship include: schoolmasters, see Ballard v. Polly, 387 F. Supp. 895 (D.D.C.
1975); Hoyen v. Manhattan Beach City School Dist., 22 Cal. 3d 508, 585 P.2d 851, 150
Cal. Rptr. 1 (1978); Miller v. Griesel, 261 Ind. 604, 308 N.E.2d 701 (1974); grandparents,
see Barrera v. General Elec. Co., 84 Misc. 2d 901, 378 N.Y.S.2d 239 (Sup. Ct. 1975);
Broome v. Horton, 83 Misc. 2d 1002, 372 N.Y.S.2d 909 (Sup. Ct. 1975); summer school
proprietor, see Brown v. Knight, 362 Mass. 350, 285 N.E.2d 790 (1972).
225. See notes 156-57 supra and accompanying text.
226. Convery v. Maczka, 163 N.J. Super. at 413, 394 A.2d at 1253-54.
227. See note 103 supra and accompanying text.
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develop his intellectual capacities. 28 Yet, the responsibility for a
child's safety lies primarily with his parents whose duty is to pro-
tect the child.' Accordingly, where a child is unable to appreciate
the risk of injury to himself, and such a risk is in the realm of
reasonable foreseeability to the parent, the parent has a legal duty
to adequately supervise his child to protect him from injury.230
Although a parent might have a legal duty to supervise a child,
the parent's duty to supervise should not render him strictly liable
for a child's injuries, nor should it serve as an absolute bar to a
child's cause of action. A legal duty of a parent to adequately super-
vise his child should be recognized only in those situations where
the parent can reasonably foresee certain dangers to the child's
well-being. To determine the duty under these circumstances, the
most equitable standard is that of the reasonable parent.23' Further-
more it is most adaptable to the individual factual and legal patterns
implicit in the family structure.232
Like the reasonable man233 test, the reasonable parent test
would allow the jury to consider the special circumstances of each
case.3 The reasonable parent could take on the qualities of the real
228. Nolechek v. Gesuale, 46 N.Y.2d at 338, 385 N.E.2d at 1272, 413 N.Y.S.2d
at 344.
229. Gabel v. Koba, 1 Wash. App. 684, 463 P.2d 237 (1969).
230. Convery v. Maczka, 163 N.J. Super. at 416, 394 A.2d at 1253.
231. See Gibson v. Gibson, 3 Cal. 3d 914, 479 P.2d 648, 92 Cal. Rptr. 288 (1971).
In Gibson, the court rejected the implicit provision of immunity cited in note 103 supra
reasoning that:
The Goller view will inevitably result in the drawing of arbitrary distinc-
tions about when particular parental conduct falls within or without the
immunity guidelines. Second, we find intolerable the notion that if a
parent can succeed in bringing himself within the "safety" of parental im-
munity, he may act negligently with impunity.
I& at 922, 479 P.2d at 653, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 293.
232. See Lastowski v. Norge Coin-O-Matic, Inc., 44 A.D.2d 127, 142, 335
N.Y.S.2d 432, 442 (1975) (Hopkins, J., dissenting).
233. See generally PROSSER, supra note 1, at 149-69. One of the earliest cases
utilizing the "reasonable man" test was Vaughn v. Menlove, 132 Eng. Rep. 490 (1837).
The court stated "[tihe care taken by a prudent man has always been the rule laid
down; and as to the supposed difficulty of applying it a jury has always been able to
say, whether, taking that rule as their guide, there has been negligence on the occa-
sion in question." Id. at 493.
234. Gibson v. Gibson, 3 Cal. 3d 914, 479 P.2d 648, 92 Cal. Rptr. 288 (1971).
Several New York decisions apparently would find liability for negligent supervision if
special circumstances were alleged. See Fake v. Terminal Hardware, Inc., 73 Misc. 2d
39, 341 N.Y.S.2d 272 (Sup. Ct. 1973) (child hit by car while in street); accord, Collazo v.
Manhattan Bronx Surface Transit Operating Authority, 72 Misc. 2d 946, 339 N.Y.S.2d
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parent, including his physical attributes as well as his intellectual
powers. 3 Also, the jury would be allowed to consider the age, train-
ing, experience and judgment of the child in determining whether
the child should have recognized the risk of injury."' Furthermore,
the cultural, educational, and financial conditions which affect the
manner in which different parents supervise their children are possi-
ble factors in determining liability.nl Although several courts have
not explicitly adopted this rationale, its application is evidenced by
inconsistent results in similar circumstances.3 '
Finally, the reasonable parent standard parallels the trend
toward a system of comparative fault. 39 Since a parent is aware of
his child's various tendencies, a parent is better able to anticipate
and control the conduct of his child. A third party, however, is free
to proceed under the assumption that other people will exercise due
care.240 Accordingly, if a parent fails to adequately supervise his
child, and a third party causes injury to the child, the entire respon-
sibility should not be thrust upon the third party. This is especially
true as the third party is often guilty of only the slightest degree of
negligence. Of all the various approaches, the reasonable parent
standard offers the most equitable resolution of the interests at
stake.
CONCLUSION
At one time, the parent-child tort immunity rule insulated the
parent from liability for any tortious acts committed against his
children. Erosion of the policy considerations underlying this ab-
solute rule influenced several courts to modify and even abrogate
the rule. However, even in those jurisdictions the courts continue to
809 (Sup. Ct. 1972); Marrero v. Just Cab Corp., 71 Misc. 2d 474, 336 N.Y.S.2d 301 (Sup.
Ct. 1972).
235. Virtually the "reasonable parent" standard is analogous to the "reason-
able man" standard and therefore could take on the same qualities. See PROSSER, supra
note 1, at 172.
236. Id
237. Id But see notes 115-18 supra and accompanying text.
238. See notes 123-38 supra. Wisconsin has adopted express provisions of im-
munity cited in note 103 supra. However, two Wisconsin cases, Lemmen and Thoreson
reached different results in similar fact situations. The only significant differences in
the two cases was the age of the child and the parent's ability to exercise immediate
control over his child. These differences explain the different conclusions the courts
reached.
239. See note 162 supr.
240. See PROSSER, supra note 1, at 171-76.
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grant immunity where a parent is exercising discretion in rearing
his child.
In determining whether immunity should be granted, several
courts have adopted inflexible standards which serve to protect the
parent from a suit by his child. This is particularly true in those
situations where a parent has abused his discretion by permitting an
unwary child to encounter dangerous situations. By characterizing
the parental duty to supervise a child as an element of parental
discretion which absolutely warrants parental immunity, courts have
allowed injured children to go uncompensated and have denied
third-party tortfeasors the means to recover contribution from the
derelict parent. Rather than utilizing inflexible standards which pro-
duce these inequities, courts should adopt the reasonable parent
standard as it is the most adaptable to the individual factual and
legal patterns implicit in the family structure.
Scott Thomas Schreiber
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